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# LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that, according to reliable information, the Government of the United States of America has embarked upon a demarche in the capitals of the States members of the Security Council in order to explain the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, on the basis of talking points dated 28 and 31 December 1998.

In the talking points, the United States alleged that the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq were "established" in 1991 and 1992, respectively, under Security Council resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991) and 688 (1991), in which the Council authorized "the U.S. and other coalition members to take the necessary action to deter or prevent the Iraqi repression of its civilian population that is addressed in resolution 688, which determined that Iraqi repression of its civilian population threatened international peace and security". It is further alleged that Iraq is "violating" the establishment of the zones and go into listing various points to create the impression that there are in fact such violations.

The basic substantive point to be dealt with is clear and simple, namely, whether the resolutions referred to by the United States do in fact authorize the so-called establishment of the no-fly zones.

It is quite clear that the position of the United States is completely unfounded. The most significant point to remember in this connection is that the provisions of resolution 678 (1990) have come to end by the provisions of paragraph 33 of resolution 687 (1991) which declared that "upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the above provisions, a formal ceasefire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990)". In the following paragraph, which is the final in resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council confirmed that any forcible future measure against Iraq requires a new authorization. Paragraph 34 of the resolution stated: "Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the region." Consequently, it is legally baseless to allege any authorization to use force against Iraq within a

formal ceasefire situation declared by the Council and in the absence of any new authorization.

This legal interpretation was confirmed on two occasions in the Security Council. In the first place, on the occasion of the discussion in the Council on 9 April 1997 of the carriage of Iraqi pilgrims by Iraqi Airways to the Holy Lands, it was clear from the objections raised by an important number of Council members against the American position, as supported by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to condemn the flight as being a violation of the resolutions of the Security Council, that the consensus of opinion amongst the rest of the members in general was that Iraq is not subject to an air embargo. Secondly, in the consultations of the Security Council which led to the adoption of resolution 1205 (1998), the United States and the United Kingdom failed in their attempt to include a provision in the draft resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq without prior recourse to the Council. Instead, the Council confirmed in paragraph 6 its decision "in accordance with its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to remain actively seized of the matter". This understanding was reconfirmed by many Council members during the official meeting of the Council held on 16 December 1998.

As for the American position that the imposition of the no-fly zones is a measure that conforms to Security Council resolution 688 (1991), such a position is also baseless. To begin with, the provisions of that resolution do not support this position. In addition, that resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which is the only Chapter in terms of which force may be used by the United Nations or on its behalf pursuant to a specific authorization. Nor did that resolution contain any provision imposing a no-fly zone in Iraqi airspace.

The use of resolution 688 (1991) as a basis for the imposition of the two no-fly zones is incompatible with the provisions of that resolution. The second preambular paragraph of that resolution refers to Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which precludes the United Nations from intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. Furthermore, in the seventh preambular paragraph of its resolution 688 (1991), the Council clearly reaffirmed the commitment of all Member States to respect Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

Consequently, and on the basis of the above, none of the points mentioned in the American talking points can be accepted as legitimate. The United States is not authorized to prohibit, attack, challenge or maintain any act. It is also unauthorized to assign to itself the role of drawing up certain purposes to the no-fly zones in order to create the false impression that they were legal.

It is, indeed, obvious that the American talking points did not stop at confusing the facts, but went further to falsifications. The members of the Council should be aware by now of the real facts in regard to the flights of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) or the question of staff of the oil-for-food programme, which contradict what the United States is trying to propagate. If the United States is truly ready to work with the Security Council members to assess the situation, it should first act in accordance with

its obligations under the Charter and international law and cease its aggression against Iraq and honour its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

In this connection, it is important to recall the factual background of the imposition of the no-fly zones in Iraq. It will be seen from this background that the no-fly zones were imposed unilaterally against Iraq for objectives totally unrelated to the Security Council resolutions.

The no-fly zone in northern Iraq

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France used the conditions prevailing in the aftermath of the war and the outbreak of wanton violence, provoked by and with the participation of external forces that ensued thereafter as a pretext to continue their acts of aggression against Iraq despite the ceasefire established by resolution 687 (1991). Those acts of aggression took the form of open intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq on the one hand, and continuation of the acts of military aggression against Iraq, on the other, under the guise of providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the civilian population. They also took the form of the imposition of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq on 7 April 1991. This measure was implemented in the following manner:

In the evening of 6 April 1991, our Permanent Representative in New York received from the American Permanent Representative a letter which read as follows:

> "As President Bush stated on 5 April 1991, the United States Air Force will fly over northern Iraq and drop foodstuffs, blankets, clothes, tents and relief materials for the Kurdish refugees. These operations proceed from humanitarian considerations with no intervention. The government of Iraq should know that the transport planes will be escorted by other aircraft to protect them when necessary. In the implementation of the existing policy, which does not permit any fixed-wing air activity in the Iraqi airspace, the American government wishes to avoid any misunderstanding or unintended confrontation with the Iraqi forces. For this end, no Iraqi aircraft should fly north of parallel 36 as from 9 o'clock of 7 April 1991 until further notice. This no-fly includes both civilian and military planes. Any aircraft that flies in the said airspace after that fixed time will do so on its own responsibility."

On the same date, the British Government announced that it would undertake a similar relief operation on 8 April 1991.

On 7 April 1991, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a letter containing Iraq's strong protest against the American-British action which violated Iraq's sovereignty and constituted a flagrant breach of the rules of international law as well as a direct intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq. If the provision of assistance had been truly humanitarian in aim, it should have been undertaken in consultation with the Iraqi authorities, and the assistance should have been provided by way of Jordan or Turkey and not by violating Iraq's

sovereignty. The Minister requested that his letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

On 10 April 1991, David Mack, the American Assistant Secretary of State, summoned the Chargé d'affaires of the Iraqi Interests Section in Washington, D.C. and handed him a letter addressed to the Iraqi Government concerning an American military operation to be undertaken in support of the Kurdish refugees which, inter alia, stressed the following points:

(a) The massive refugee flows threaten international peace and stability in the region;

(b) With Secretary of State Baker's visit to the Turkish-Iraqi borders on 8 April 1991, it has become clear that extraordinary efforts will be needed to stabilize the situation and remove this threat;

(c) Safe conduct of these operations necessitates continued combat air patrols in Iraqi airspace so long as United States forces are operating. These patrols will continue even with a Security Council declaration of a formal ceasefire;

(d) To avoid any possible misunderstanding or conflict with the Iraqi forces, the United States does not permit any fixed-wing Iraqi air activity and no Iraqi aircraft of any kind, including helicopters, should fly north of parallel 36 until further notice.

The Iraqi Government's response to the American letter was immediate and clear. In a letter sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the same date, i.e. 10 April 1991, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed that Iraq was an independent, sovereign State and that it rejected intervention in its internal affairs. The flights by American aircraft constituted a violation of Iraq's sovereignty. If those flights were intended to monitor the relief operations as claimed by the United States, then it was possible to consult and cooperate with Iraq to that end. Iraq did not reject relief operations for those citizens, but demanded that the relief efforts be coordinated and organized with the Iraqi competent authorities. The Iraqi Government viewed with suspicion and distrust the insistence on the continued violation of Iraqi airspace on the pretext of monitoring the relief operations despite the fact that a definitive ceasefire was in force. There was no justification for those continued violations which created a state of tension and constituted a dangerous precedent in international relations.

Prodded by the United States of America, Britain sought to obtain support in the Security Council for the idea of creating inside Iraqi territory an enclave to be used as a safe haven for the Kurds pending their return to their abodes under the supervision of the United Nations. The idea was proposed by the British Ambassador to the Security Council at a meeting of informal consultations held on 8 April 1991 with a view to preparing the way for its approval.

Iraq responded to this move by a letter dated 10 April 1991 addressed to the President of the Security Council with the request that it be circulated to

the members of the Council. The letter stated that Iraq was prepared to ensure the safe return of all Kurdish citizens to their abodes and provide all that is required for their return. Iraq would welcome coverage of that operation by the international media and allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to participate therein. The letter confirmed the decision to grant amnesty to the Kurds, and welcomed the Committee which was to be dispatched by the Secretary-General to monitor the situation in the north.

On the night of 16 April 1991, the British Defence Council held a meeting under the chairmanship of Prime Minister John Major to discuss the question of dispatching military forces to northern Iraq, following which it was announced on 17 April 1991 that the American President George Bush had approved sending air and ground forces from the coalition States to northern Iraq. On the same date, it was announced in London that the British Defence Office had decided to send 2,000 British troops to one of its bases in Germany, where a decision would be taken as to the number that would join the military force stationed in northern Iraq.

Following that date, the coalition Powers started to send their military forces and equipment to Iraq at will by way of Al-Khabur border entry point. When Turkey began to be apprehensive about that operation out of concern that the aim might be to create a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, it asked the United States to inform Turkey of the number of the forces to be dispatched as well as obtain the approval of the Turkish general staff thereto in advance. As a consequence, the coalition built an airfield in the Iraqi town of Sarsang, and coalition military forces and their equipment began to be transported by air directly to that airfield as soon as it was ready for service.

The number of the forces which participated in that operation from the United States of America alone was as follows: air force, 4,359; ground forces, 4,509; naval forces, 594; marines, 1,793, in addition to 2,200 soldiers stationed in the Turkish Incerlik base and 6,349 soldiers attached to the American East Mediterranean Fleet.

Of the total number of the troops stationed inside Iraq, 5,602 were stationed in Zakho; 839 in Sarsang; 653 in Amadiyah; 646 in Kani Mas and 409 in Batula.

On 10 May 1991, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations in New York met with British Ambassador David Hannay at United Nations Headquarters at the latter's request. The British Ambassador conveyed his Government's position concerning the Secretary-General's statement announcing Iraq's rejection of the civil police issue. He stressed that the presence of the United Nations would give the Kurdish refugees assurance of their security and safety with no interference in Iraq's territorial unity, sovereignty or independence. "We are not reluctant", he stated, "to secure the adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII, and we know that we can; but we prefer to act in accordance with resolution 688 (1991) which is not based on Chapter VII. We are not asking for any enthusiasm for accepting the idea on the part of your Government but for an endorsement of the matter to let the refugees feel that they have the kind of protection or guarantee that will help them to return to their homes."

On 27 June 1991, the American Representative to the United Nations handed our Permanent Representative a copy of a paper containing talking points which he said expressed the position of the United States and the coalition States and which included the following:

(a) The coalition Governments have a strong interest in peace and order in Iraq, and they are prepared to reply militarily to Iraqi acts which disturb peace, as the case may justify;

(b) Below are guidelines which will remain in force even after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq:

* The Government of Iraq should cooperate with relief activities throughout;

* No Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters should fly north of parallel 36;

* The Iraqi army and police forces should remain outside the security zone;

* The coalition will undertake reconnaissance flights over the security zone whenever that is required;

* The military representatives of the coalition and Iraq will continue their weekly meetings in Duhok even after the withdrawal of the coalition forces;

* The military presence of the coalition will continue in Turkey and on aircraft carriers in the sea.

A copy of the text of those talking points was handed to the Chargé d'affaires of the Iraqi Interests Section in Washington, D.C. Another copy was handed to the Iraqi Government through the military channels in northern Iraq.

It is worth recalling in this connection that, during the weeks following the Anglo-American intervention in northern Iraq, the Iraqi Government succeeded in coordination with the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to repatriate the Iraqi Kurdish citizens who were forced to leave their homeland and take refuge in the mountains abroad. Although the situation settled down subsequently in the three Iraqi northern Governorates, which eliminated all the pretexts of the United States and the United Kingdom to continue with their intervention, they nonetheless continued with the imposition of the no-fly zone.

The no-fly zone in southern Iraq

The United States, assisted by the British and French Governments, continued its attempts to expand the scope of intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq and to seek to undermine its stability and threaten its national unity and territorial integrity.

To prepare the ground for those acts which ran counter to the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law, a meeting of the Security Council was held on 11 August 1992 to hear the rapporteur on human rights in Iraq, Mr. van der Stoel, in contravention of the modalities and rules of procedure followed in the work of the Organization, especially in view of the fact that the work of the Special Rapporteur appertains to the Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council, and it is not part of his responsibility to report to the Security Council.

Mr. van der Stoel's report contained a heap of unsubstantiated and untrue charges and accusations concerning violations of human rights in southern Iraq in addition to his false allegations about damage to the environment and the inhabitants of the marshes caused by Leader Saddam River Project.

Immediately following the hearing of this fabricated report, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France announced on 27 August 1991 the imposition of a no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel on the pretext of protecting the Shi'ite Iraqi citizens in southern Iraq.

The Security Council adopted no resolution to that effect nor did it give the American Government or any other Government any authorization to take any military action of that kind.

Iraq rejected that no-fly zone decision and, on 27 August 1992, it declared in clear terms through an authorized official spokesman of the Revolutionary Command Council that it reserved its rights as to the course of action it would take with regard to that aggressive decision and the methods it would use to put its rejection in force.

On 6 January 1993, the United States, the United Kingdom and France each handed our Permanent Representative in New York a written position in which, after making reference to the imposition of a no-fly zone south of parallel 32, they stated that Iraqi military aircraft had been recurrently observed in the said zone in violation of the no-fly zone and that Iraq had moved SAM missile batteries to new sites south of parallel 32, thus posing a threat to the aircraft of those States. They demanded that the missile batteries be withdrawn and returned to their original sites within 48 hours of the date of the above position; that there should be no flights of any civilian or military fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters south of the 32nd parallel; and that Iraq should undertake no illumination or tracing by radar of any aircraft and should flash no signals indicating a hostile intention. The said States would react in an appropriate and decisive manner towards any failure on Iraq's part to comply with those demands, and that constituted a final warning.

Extension of the no-fly zones

In a letter addressed to President Saddam Hussein on 22 August 1996, Mr. Masoud al-Barzani, Chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, stated that the city of Erbil was being subjected to a joint aggression by the group of Jalal al-Talbani and the Islamic Republic of Iran, resulting in the martyrdom and wounding of many defenceless citizens and the destruction of their property.

"The conspiracy is bigger than our capability", Mr. al-Barzani pointed out, "and we therefore request your Excellency to order the Iraqi armed forces to intervene to support us in repelling the foreign danger and putting an end to Jalal al-Talbani's conspiracy and his treason".

In the light of this letter and the explicit character of the Iranian military intervention, the Iraqi Government decided to provide support and military aid to Mr. Masoud al-Barzani. It also decided that such military intervention be limited and kept within the framework of the provision of aid and support.

That action on the part of Iraq fell within the scope of its sovereignty over its own territory and the framework of its duty to defend its own people and ward off any foreign aggression to which they might be subjected. This is a right that is assured by all international pacts and laws, and there is nothing to prevent a State from protecting its own citizens.

Taking advantage of those developments of the situation in northern Iraq, the United States used them as a pretext to launch missile attacks against Iraq in the south, with the result that many civilian installations were destroyed and many civilians were martyred and wounded.

On 3 September 1996, President Clinton announced that the decision to strike Iraq was taken in order to "punish Saddam Hussein for the act he committed and to limit his ability to threaten his neighbours and the interests of America". In the same statement, he pointed out that the American Administration had decided to extend the no-fly zone in southern Iraq in order to "deprive Saddam of control over Iraqi airspace from the borders of Kuwait to the southern suburbs of Baghdad; limit Iraq's ability to carry out offensive operations in the area, and safeguard the safety of our aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone".

On the same date, i.e. 3 September 1996, the American State Department sent a letter to Iraq through our Permanent Mission in New York, in which it emphasized that the no-fly zone in the south imposed in 1992 had been extended from the 32nd parallel to the 33rd parallel with effect from noon of 4 September (Baghdad local time). The letter pointed out that the current rules governing any Iraqi air activities in the area below parallel 32 would be applied to the extension area. The necessary steps were taken to ensure the safety of air crews implementing the operations above the extension area, and any other Iraqi acts threatening peace and security would result in dire consequences.

Iraq's reply to that American action was quite clear: the President of the Republic of Iraq himself declared that Iraq would not recognize the parallels in question and that orders had been issued to its armed forces to engage any coalition aircraft flying in Iraqi airspace.

On 7 September 1996, the United States State Department sent a fax message to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq in New York in reply to Iraq's declaration. It stated the following:

"Your government has announced that it will not respect the no-fly zones imposed by the alliance and that it has issued orders to its forces to engage any aircraft belonging to the alliance flying in Iraqi airspace. The governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, therefore, demand that:

* Iraq not reinforce or introduce new surface-to-air missile systems, including mobile systems, south of the 33 degree latitude.

* Iraq not redeploy surface-to-air missile systems that are currently south of the 33 degree latitude to new positions south of the 33 degree latitude.

* Iraq not repair or rebuild surface-to-air missile systems south of the 33 degree latitude which have been damaged or destroyed by coalition forces since 3 September 1996.

* We remind Iraq that any surface-to-air missile systems that illuminate and/or trace coalition aircraft with fire control radar will be considered hostile. In the event that you fail to comply with the stated demands you will be liable to face military action against the systems concerned."

Iraq announced its rejection of those illegitimate American demands.

It is significant to note that the Anglo-American pretext for imposing the southern no-fly zone in 1992 was allegedly to provide protection to the Shi'ite population of southern Iraq. With the extension of the said zone, however, that pretext has changed to be to limit the ability of Iraq to threaten its neighbours.

Non-authorization

It is clear that there has been no authorization to impose the no-fly zones from the Security Council, which is the only organ empowered under the Charter to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council has not authorized the taking of unilateral forcible measures against Iraq in the form of no-fly zones. As we have seen, no acceptable legal justification was presented by the Powers maintaining the zones, and consequently the zones remain to be forcible actions in violation of the prohibition of the use of force under the Charter against Iraq, its territorial integrity and national unity. Moreover, the Powers maintaining the zones failed to indicate what authority has given them the power to undertake their so-called supervision of the application of resolution 688 (1991) in southern Iraq and to exercise the role of human rights monitor in Iraq.

The facts make it clear that the imposition of the no-fly zones is a unilateral decision that has nothing to do with the United Nations and its resolutions. This was confirmed by the official spokesman of the United Nations, Joe Sills who, on 7 January 1993, stated that the imposition of the no-fly zone in southern Iraq was not based on any Security Council resolution.

It should be noted that the French Government suspended in 1996 its participation in the illegal actions in the northern no-fly zone. It has also confirmed this suspension in general as late as 23 December 1998.

The position of the United States and the United Kingdom in question have not been supported by two permanent members of the Security Council, namely, China and the Russian Federation, as well as a number of other members of the Council. This explains why the United States and the United Kingdom have not been able to get the authorization from the Council for their illegal act.

On the basis of the above, the imposition and the enforcement of the no-fly zones in question is an internationally wrongful act in flagrant violation of the Charter and well-established rules of international law. They constitute use of armed force against Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence contrary to the Charter. They violate the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) on 24 October 1970, which was considered by the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case in 1986 as reflecting customary international law. They also amount to a continuous act of aggression under the definition of aggression adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 3314 (XXIX) on 14 December 1974.

As such, the United States and the United Kingdom bear the full international responsibility for their illegal actions. Moreover, the Governments in the region which render facilities and support to the United States and the United Kingdom to enable them to impose and enforce the no-fly zones share with them the same violation and consequently the same international responsibility.

At the same time, Iraq is fully entitled under the Charter and international law to exercise its legitimate right to self-defence against such a continuous act of aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, a report on the progress which my Government has made despite the difficulties resulting from the war being waged in the country (see annex).

In his statement of 30 June 1997 regarding the worsening situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the eve of 17 May 1997, the President of the Republic emphasized a dual goal: the restoration and the democratization of the political system. To meet that goal, reforms were required at all levels, particularly in the political, economic and legal spheres.

In the political arena, major efforts have been made to establish structures to prepare for the holding of free, democratic elections at all political levels of Congolese society.

With regard to the economy, which is the basis of any lasting social and political reform for the benefit of the population as a whole, measures have been taken to control inflation and halt the currency depreciation that had reached a scarcely conceivable level.

In the legal and human rights field, a Ministry of Human Rights has been established in order to further promote respect for human rights, and efforts have been made to improve the legal system.

This report has been prepared and transmitted to you in order to give the international community an idea of what has been planned and achieved.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) André MWAMBA KAPANGA
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

Reforms and political programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, New York, 14 December 1998

## I. PREAMBLE

In his statement of 30 June 1997 on the occasion of the thirty-seventh anniversary of the independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, His Excellency Mr. Laurent Désiré Kabila, President of the Republic, described the stages of the process of restoration and democratization of the country's political system. The essential stages of this process are:

(a) July 1997: Appointment of the Chairman of the Constitutional Commission;

(b) August 1997: Establishment of the Constitutional Commission;

(c) September 1997: Solemn inauguration of the Constitutional Commission;

(d) March 1998: Submission to the head of State of the draft Constitution, accompanied by detailed reports of the Commission's work;

(e) April 1998: Convocation of candidates for the election of deputies to the Constituent Assembly;

(f) June 1998: Election of deputies to the Constituent Assembly;

(g) 30 June 1998: Inauguration of the Constituent Assembly;

(h) October 1998: Submission to the head of State of the new Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(i) December 1998: Possible referendum on the Constitution;

(j) April 1999: Legislative and presidential elections.

The restoration and democratization of the political system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is necessary in order to complete the political adjustment which took place in 1997 and which has raised high hopes of political, economic and social change both within and outside the country's borders.

As at 17 May 1997, the Democratic Republic of the Congo faced enormous challenges as a consequence of the past dictatorship, and its future was threatened by certain realities stemming from structural constraints on the country's economic and social development, including:

(a) The low gross domestic product (GDP), which was essentially equivalent to that of 1958, although the population had tripled in size since that time,

the annual demographic growth rate having risen from 2.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent;

(b) The extremely low level of fiscal revenue, which currently accounts for less than 4 per cent of GDP, as opposed to 17 per cent prior to independence;

(c) The virtual absence of government investment, which was on the order of 14 per cent in 1958;

(d) The general collapse of public enterprises in key sectors, including mining, transport and public utilities, which are dominated by public enterprises of which the great majority are bankrupt or in serious difficulty;

(e) The external debt burden, which continues to hinder development programmes and policies and to discourage growth opportunities;

(f) The predominance of subsistence-level activities, of which agriculture, which accounts for 60 per cent of GDP, remains an essential component;

(g) Increasing urbanization, as a result of which over 13 million people now live in urban areas, as compared with 3.4 million at the time of independence;

(h) The destruction of social and physical infrastructures;

(i) Failing bureaucratic structures.

Owing to these constraints, the Congolese people are deprived of their fundamental human rights and, in particular, suffer from:

(a) Lack of access to safe drinking water and food;

(b) Lack of an adequate health care system;

(c) Lack of security of person and property;

(d) Lack of a reliable education system.

These limitations explain the great and urgent need to undertake reforms in a number of areas, including the political, through the establishment of new institutions which will enable the country to hold the first free, transparent and democratic elections in its history.

All of these reforms, which require greater involvement of the international community, are intended to bring about the stability of the Congo as an essential condition of the stability of Central Africa as a whole.

## II. ECONOMIC REFORMS

Reforms in this area have supported the Triennial Reconstruction Plan, which focuses on revitalizing the national economy, rehabilitating basic infrastructures, controlling inflation, fighting corruption and unemployment and protecting property and personal safety.

One of the components of the economic reform programme has been monetary reform, as symbolized on 30 June 1998 by the launching of the Congolese franc, the new national currency.

The Government has also implemented a series of policies that have resulted in:

(a) The stabilization of the exchange rate, which had been fluctuating around 100 per cent;

(b) Reduction of inflation from around four figures in 1997 to a single digit, or about 7 per cent, on 30 June 1998;

(c) A significant reduction in taxes on petroleum products, which lowered the price at the pump by over 50 per cent. This had a beneficial effect on transport costs and basic food prices, which fell by an average of over 30 per cent;

(d) A considerable reduction in corruption;

(e) An improvement in the protection of property and personal safety;

(f) Rehabilitation of hospital and education infrastructures.

In order to make further improvements and enable the Government to complete the necessary economic and social reforms and guide the country towards sustainable development, the Democratic Republic of the Congo must have:

(a) A significant reduction and rescheduling of its debt;

(b) Investments in its energy and transport infrastructures and in its health and education services;

(c) Investment in the training of government and private-sector managers;

(d) Direct investment in production activities, particularly in the private sector.

The resumption of dialogue with the international financial institutions and with private and official bilateral partners could enable these objectives to be met through the sound macroeconomic policies to which the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is committed. To that end, and in the light of recent events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, another meeting of the "Friends of the Congo" will be needed, in order to make a suitable

appraisal of the efforts to be undertaken to revitalize and rebuild the economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo desires to:

(a) Reaffirm its unwavering determination to pursue sound macroeconomic policies in order to ensure the country's sustainable development;

(b) Identify obstacles in its way and make realistic development plans;

(c) To that end, strengthen its relations and re-establish confidence with the Bretton Woods institutions, the bilateral and multilateral financial institutions, the United Nations, the European Union and other donor countries.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is convinced that any socio-economic reform without consequent political change will be inadequate. Such reform must also ensure respect for fundamental civil and political rights, together with economic rights.

## III. LEGAL REFORMS

Legal reform is another area in which the Democratic Republic of the Congo has requested the international community's support.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that efforts must be redoubled to strengthen the country's civil and military legal systems, making them impartial, credible and effective. The Government is now implementing policies to promote inclusion, coexistence, cooperation and security.

The Government of the Democratic Republic considers that it will be able to make remarkable progress in the area of human rights if it is provided with the necessary means to improve its legal system. The Government therefore reiterates its request for substantial financial assistance in its efforts to carry out a thoroughgoing reform of its legal system.

## IV. BORDER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is located in a conflict zone which has for decades undergone crises of all sorts, and these must be reckoned with. The most recent, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, left a burdensome heritage of fear and hatred which continues to haunt the entire region.

The Great Lakes region has been destabilized because armed bands do not hesitate to use the territories of the host countries to attack their enemies in their countries of origin.

The Great Lakes region is even more unstable because States arrogate to themselves the right to violate the national sovereignty and territorial

integrity of other countries on the false pretext of seeking to protect their own national security.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo requests the international community to take note of the lessons learned from the region's tragic past.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo undertakes to apply humanitarian principles, including the right of civilian populations to assistance in times of conflict and the protection of refugees and non-combatants. It also undertakes to work together with the regional parties, both governmental and non-governmental, to give humanitarian workers access to all the populations in need.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo affirms that the restoration of regional peace and stability requires the cessation of impunity and the re-establishment of the rule of law.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo affirms also that poverty is one of the threats to stability in the Great Lakes region and to the viability of democracy in that region. To that end, it reiterates its oft-stated invitation to the countries of the region to work together to speed up the region's economic recovery and its complete integration into the global economy, and to increase trade and consider mutually advantageous investment opportunities.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that the security interests of the countries of the region will be served if they cooperate in the fight against the transnational problems of terrorism, the spread of disease, arms proliferation, drug trafficking and environmental degradation. It also recognizes that these countries have an essential mutual interest in a serious, lasting commitment.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo welcomes the determination and the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa.

## V. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stresses its attachment to respect for human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The Government encourages public participation in political life and respect for human rights. It believes that social, economic and political inclusion is the foundation of lasting peace and stability.

The recent establishment of a Ministry of Human Rights demonstrates the firm commitment of my Government to improving the mechanisms for the protection of human rights in the Congo.

The Ministry of Human Rights can claim credit for protecting individuals during the attack on Kinshasa in August 1998. The Ministry also afforded United Nations and humanitarian personnel based in Kinshasa, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), access without risk or restrictions to prisoners of war and persons detained for their safety, in accordance with international humanitarian law.

## VI. POLITICAL REFORMS

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, recalling that the country had no experience of democracy for over 30 years, affirms its strong determination to introduce democracy, based on the principle of respect for fundamental human rights and law, into its system of government.

One of the Government's first official acts was the inauguration, on 5 November 1997, of a Constitutional Commission, which in April 1998 presented a draft constitution.

Had it not been for the armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government would have proceeded on 15 August 1998 to the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly, responsible for examining the draft constitution prepared by the Constitutional Commission for submission to a referendum to be held in the following year.

In order to save the democratization process from the pernicious effects of war, and after consultations with certain segments of the population, the Presidential Commission on Institutional Reforms, responsible for examining the preliminary draft constitution prepared by the Constitutional Commission and making proposals for any necessary changes to the President of the Republic, was established on 21 September 1998.

The Commission on Institutional Reforms transmitted its conclusions to the President of the Republic on 23 October 1998. The draft constitution is now undergoing careful examination by the various elements of Congolese civil society.

It is important to emphasize at this stage that, despite the war of aggression that was imposed on it, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has adhered to the timetable laid down by the President of the Republic in his statement of 30 June 1998.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has, through its President, given assurances that political activity will resume by 30 January 1999. The state of emergency previously in force had as its sole aim to ensure the establishment without lethal procrastination of a State based on the rule of law and the attainment of a culture of democracy and human rights.

Together with the resumption of political activity, the Government plans to promulgate an Electoral Act that will give particular emphasis to the establishment of national, rather than ethnic or regional, political parties.

The Government also promises that elections will be held in 1999. It fervently hopes that these elections will be fair, transparent and free. A population census will be needed to this end. In view of the limited resources at its disposal, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo appeals to the international community and, in particular, the United Nations, to provide it with assistance that will enable it to carry out this noble and difficult task.

To be sure, the strides towards democracy that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is able to make will depend mainly on:

(a) The restoration of peace and security throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(b) Acceleration of the economic reform process;

(c) The rapid revitalization of the economy;

(d) International assistance to promote the recovery of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the rebuilding of its shattered economy and the restoration and repair of essential services and the national infrastructure.

## VII. OUTLOOK

The Government believes that the destiny and security of the Congo are mainly in the hands of the Congolese.

The Government is aware that the stability of the Congo depends also on its capacity to continue the democratization process.

The Government reaffirms its determination to respect the fundamental principles of inclusion, the rule of law, respect for human rights, equality among all men and women and the right of all citizens to elect their leaders fairly and freely and to participate fully in the adoption of decisions affecting their lives.

The Government is of the view that the national organizations of civil society can play an important role in facilitating the transition from a situation characterized by authoritarian government and conflict to one of democracy, and that they can contribute to the social, political and economic development of the Congo.

The Government recognizes the crucial role played by State institutions, both local and national, in laying down the foundations of democracy, and places particular emphasis on strengthening the capacities of these institutions.

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NATIONS

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S/1999/47
15 January 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the statement by the Presidency of the European Union on Sierra Leone issued on 12 January 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dieter KASTRUP
Permanent Representative of
Germany to the United Nations

99-00986 (E) 150199 150199

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement by the Presidency of the European Union
on Sierra Leone issued on 12 January 1999

The European Union strongly condemns the latest attempt to overthrow the democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone and reiterates its full support for President Kabbah and his Government. The European Union commends the role of the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The European Union will continue to support ECOMOG's efforts to restore peace and stability in Sierra Leone and will provide appropriate humanitarian assistance for those in need.

The European Union strongly condemns all those who have supported the rebels in Sierra Leone and expresses its grave concern at reports that arms and personnel are being supplied, in particular, from the territory of Liberia. It calls on all States to comply strictly with existing arms embargoes.

The European Union will continue to support all diplomatic efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and security in Sierra Leone and calls on all parties to protect civilians. It welcomes offers of dialogue and mediation from States in the region. In this context, the European Union endorses the approach agreed upon at the ECOWAS meeting of the Committee of Six on Sierra Leone in Abidjan on 28 December 1998.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the European Free Trade Association countries, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this statement.

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15 January 1999

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LETTER DATED 15 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 14 January 1999, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

Annex

Letter dated 14 January 1999 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the monthly report on the operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) (see appendix). I would appreciate your making the present report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

## Appendix

## Report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. During the reporting period (18 November to 17 December 1998), there were on average approximately 32,500 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia with contributions from all the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from 20 non-NATO countries. The number of non-NATO troop-contributing nations declined to 19 during December.

2. Over the reporting period, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. Combat aircraft flew 107 hours and the SFOR helicopter fleet flew over 103 hours.

3. The Force continues to monitor crossing points on the border with the Federation Republic of Yugoslavia, to inspect government-owned factories and weapon storage sites in order to help ensure compliance with the prohibition on the transport of weapons established by Security Council resolution 1160 (1998).

4. SFOR forces continued to secure the Srpska Radio Television transmission tower at Trebevic.

5. SFOR acted in support of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with the detention on 2 December 1998 of General Radislav Krstic, Commander of the V Corps, Bosnian Serb Army. Support was also provided to ICTY's programme of investigations and exhumations.

### Cooperation and compliance by the parties

6. During the reporting period, the Entity Armed Forces remained substantially compliant with the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, SFOR executed an operation in the Stolac area against illegal arms trafficking from 26 November to 8 December and supported the International Police Task Force inspections of a series of local police buildings on 14 and 15 December, during which weapons and ammunition were confiscated. There were also confrontations between police from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Martin Brod area.

7. The Republica Srpska Specialist Police remain compliant with the Peace Agreement. On 2 December, a 3-month policeman-technician course under the auspices of the authorities of the Republica Srpska controlled by the International Police Task Force in Doboj Police Academy with 350 attendees, among them 154 Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade officers. SFOR will continue to monitor the RSSP until they can be certified as falling under Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement. This process is estimated to be completed by May 1999.

8. There are no significant issues to report regarding the restrictions on freedom of movement during the period and no checkpoints were dismantled

either by SFOR or by the International Police Task Force. The entities remain fully compliant.

9. Over the reporting period, SFOR carried out a total of 289 military weapons storage site inspections: 68 Bosniac; 47 Bosnian Croat; 48 Federation; and 126 Bosnian Serb. No major discrepancies were reported. To date, the Entity Armed Forces have closed 72 per cent of those sites required to be closed between 10 June 1998 and 28 February 1999. There remain 42 sites due for closure. The final consolidation period ends on 28 February 1999.

10. SFOR also monitored 942 training and movement activities over the reporting period: 173 Bosniac; 48 Bosnian Croat; 156 Federation; and 565 Bosnian Serb. However, due to non-compliance, training and movement bans were imposed on a number of units during this period. The ban imposed on the Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade of the Republica Srpska Specialist Police remains in effect until further notice.

11. During the period, SFOR monitored 645 mine clearance operations by the Entity Armed Forces who remain fully compliant with mine clearing. SFOR conducted 259 de-mining operations removing a total of 61 devices (51 anti-personnel mines and 10 items of unexploded ordnance) from 7,489 square metres of land. The total number of all categories of mines cleared by SFOR since March 1998 is 29,067 from 127,665 square metres of land. Owing to weather conditions and a lack of de-mining insurance, this period constitutes the last for mine clearance operations until February or March 1999. The de-miners of the Entity Armed Forces have commenced their winter de-mining training campaign, which includes equipment maintenance and the reduction in field fortifications and landmine stockpiles.

12. Joint Military Commission meetings continue. A declaration of support by the Entity Armed Forces for the voluntary gathering of illegal weapons and explosives and the storage of ammunition and explosives was welcomed at a meeting in December.

Cooperation with international institutions

13. Within capabilities, SFOR continued to provide assistance to international organizations, including the Office of the High Representative, the World Bank, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) including the International Police Task Force.

14. SFOR is also assisting the efforts of the Office of the High Representative to open airfields and facilitate civil air operations. Site surveys of the four international airports of Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla are being conducted in order to provide correct and updated geographic coordinates, obstacle charts and approach procedures.

Outlook

15. The arrival of refugees from Kosovo in Bosnia and Herzegovina has added to the humanitarian problems in the country. The forthcoming arbitration of Brcko may have an effect on the security situation. Sporadic acts of intimidation and violence towards displaced persons and refugees are expected to continue.

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# REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA)

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 1213 (1998) of 3 December 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a report no later than 15 January 1999 regarding the status of the peace process, the future role and mandate of the United Nations in Angola and the force structure of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) in the light of its ability to carry out its mandated tasks.

## II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Since my previous report, the overall situation in Angola has taken a turn towards a military confrontation with serious humanitarian consequences. Several statements made by the parties, together with the intensifying hostilities, effectively ended any hope for the resumption of the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) in the foreseeable future. Although Jonas Savimbi of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) reaffirmed in general terms his commitment to the Protocol in his letter addressed to me on 3 December 1998, his subsequent messages to me and to my Special Representative, Issa B. Y. Diallo, gave no indication that UNITA intended to resume the implementation of its key obligations under the Protocol. However, Mr. Savimbi indicated his strong wish to meet with Mr. Diallo as well as the need for the presence of international observers in Angola to serve as "useful witnesses". According to a press report of 13 January 1999, a senior member of UNITA indicated that it wished to re-establish a dialogue with the Government.

3. For his part, the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, in his opening address to the Fourth Congress of the Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA), held in Luanda from 5 to 10 December 1998, stated that the only path to lasting peace was the total isolation of Mr. Savimbi and his group. The President called for the early conclusion of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the termination of the MONUA mandate. At the same time, he indicated the need to begin preparations for the next legislative and

presidential elections, to be held within two to three years. Furthermore, in his end-of-year address, the President reiterated his Government's rejection of any dialogue with Mr. Savimbi. During his meeting with Under-Secretary-General Benon Sevan, whom I dispatched as my Special Emissary in connection with the tragic incidents involving two United Nations aircraft (addressed in paras. 8-10 below), the President stated that the United Nations had completed the implementation of its major tasks.

4. Public statements by both parties appear to indicate their intention to continue and, if necessary, escalate the fighting. In a recent public statement, the Chief of General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) asserted that "the war had only begun" and that FAA would fight until Mr. Savimbi and his associates were "neutralized". In a similar vein, the Secretary-General of UNITA stated that the rebel movement would step up fighting against the Government of Angola. In this context, he remarked that UNITA was prepared to enter into the military race, declaring that "we would see who would win".

5. My Special Representative, in collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), continued to maintain contacts with the parties, including the newly established UNITA Restoration Committee (UNITA-Renovada) and UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, as well as representatives of civil society in Angola. The withdrawal, on 6 December 1998, of MONUA from UNITA-held areas has significantly hampered communications with that group. Owing to the well-known position of the Government of Angola, my Special Representative has not been able to meet directly with Mr. Savimbi or any of his senior representatives.

6. Government and military officials, as well as representatives from MPLA and UNITA-Renovada, have made public statements claiming that the United Nations was responsible for the present deterioration of the security situation in Angola and for the failure to demilitarize UNITA forces. In view of the obvious implications of such statements for the safety of MONUA and other international personnel in Angola, my Special Representative, supported by representatives of the observer States, protested those assertions. Subsequently, in a note verbale dated 21 December 1998, the Minister of Territorial Administration and head of the government delegation to the Joint Commission advised my Special Representative to concentrate all MONUA personnel in Luanda given the renewal of military hostilities and the fact that MONUA observers were no longer monitoring the situation on the ground, and to gradually repatriate them, since the Government of Angola did not envisage the extension of the mandate of the Mission beyond February 1999.

## III. SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL

7. The negative public atmosphere created by the Angola media campaign against the United Nations has been compounded by incidents of harassment and non-cooperation with MONUA in several areas of the country, including Luanda. In view of the increased security threat, MONUA, in close coordination with the Secretariat, continued to review the deployment of its teams and decided, in December 1998, to relocate all United Nations team sites to safer areas.

8. The exposure of United Nations personnel in Angola to grave security risks was demonstrated by the apparent shooting down near Huambo of two United Nations aircraft, with a total of 15 passengers and 8 crew members, on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 respectively. Both aircraft, chartered by MONUA, went down in areas of active military operations. The two Angolan parties denied any responsibility for those incidents. Despite strong and repeated appeals by me, my Special Representative and the Security Council, UNITA and the Government initially showed no inclination to cooperate with MONUA in the search and rescue operations or to cease hostilities in the areas where the aircraft had gone down. Attempts to survey the sites by using United Nations aircraft were not successful, since neither party gave consent to such an operation. In the meantime, the Government presented to the press a purported deserter who claimed that he was aware of several survivors of the first crash. This statement was repeated by some government officials.

9. On 31 December, I dispatched the United Nations Security Coordinator, Under-Secretary-General Sevan, to Angola as my Special Emissary, in order to expedite the conduct of the search-and-rescue operations and to assess the security situation on the ground. On 5 January, Mr. Sevan met with senior government officials and, on 6 January, was received by President dos Santos. Mr. Sevan impressed upon President dos Santos the need to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers in Angola, and asked that senior government officials refrain from making statements that could adversely affect the safety and security of United Nations personnel. During that meeting, President dos Santos promised his Government's assistance in the rescue operations. At that time, FAA had advanced into the area of the first crash, making it possible to visit the site. Also, after numerous attempts, the United Nations received general security assurances from UNITA.

10. On 8 January, the United Nations rescue team, with an escort from FAA, reached the site of the first aircraft. It was able to stay there just short of two hours and had to return to Huambo before dark. According to observers, the aircraft had spiralled to the ground at a very high speed, with the result that much of it was buried. It appeared highly unlikely that there could be any survivors. The team was able to recover some human remains, as well as parts of the cockpit voice recorder, which had been tampered with. The tape has been sent out for analysis. Apparently, an effort had also been made to conceal the aircraft with tree branches. MONUA continued its efforts to visit the site again to pursue the examination of the craft and to recover human remains and equipment. However, at the time of the drafting of the present report, the parties had not allowed MONUA to visit the site because of renewed heavy fighting in the area. Simultaneously, persistent attempts were made to ascertain the site of the second crash. On 12 January, UNITA informed Mr. Sevan that the wreckage had been located.

11. In response to these developments, the United Nations decided to limit its air operations in Angola to the most essential medical and casualty evacuations and to expedite the withdrawal of all its personnel to Luanda, as also requested by the Government. The deployment and rotation of United Nations personnel to the mission area has been stopped. On 7 January, MONUA was informed that, pursuant to the guidance of President dos Santos, all FAA regional commanders had been instructed to cooperate with the United Nations in the withdrawal of

its personnel and equipment from the team sites and regional headquarters. By 14 January, out of a total of 26 team sites and regional headquarters, MONUA had evacuated to Luanda 17 teams, with the remaining scheduled to be fully withdrawn by the beginning of February. While all efforts are being made to ensure that United Nations property is safely recovered from the team sites, it is feared that it may not be possible to withdraw all the equipment from sites located in areas of active combat. At the same time, plans have been finalized for the repatriation of military observers and civilian police. Plans are also being prepared for the repatriation of military contingents.

## IV. IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IMPOSED ON THE UNIÃO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA

12. In its resolutions 1202 (1998) of 15 October 1998 and 1213 (1998) of 3 December 1998, the Security Council requested me to provide recommendations regarding technical and other ways for Member States to improve the implementation of the measures against UNITA contained in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1221 (1999).

13. In order to enhance the implementation of those measures, it would be essential that Governments that are in possession of information concerning violations provide such information to the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 864 (1993) on a regular basis. Governments whose territories are being used by violators of the adopted measures should be ready and willing to take the necessary measures to prevent such violations. In the absence of a monitoring mechanism to support the work of the Committee, the potential role of regional and subregional arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the measures could also be explored.

14. In order to strengthen the implementation of the measures, the Security Council and Member States may wish to consider the following:

(a) Member States, in particular States neighbouring Angola, could provide, on a regular basis, information on the implementation of the measures adopted by the Security Council. The Council could also invite their views on possible ways to strengthen the effectiveness of those measures;

(b) While the responsibility for the implementation of these measures rests with Member States, the Security Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) could review the implementation process periodically with a view to identifying and possibly eliminating gaps and monitoring the effectiveness of the adopted measures; such a review may be initiated on the basis of a report by the Chairman of the Committee following a mission that he may wish to undertake to Angola and the countries of the region;

(c) It would be essential that the Committee be provided by Member States, on a regular basis, with the information necessary to enable it to consider and investigate possible violations of the mandatory measures. Cases of confirmed violations could be made public by the Committee or reported to the Security Council;

(d) The Government of Angola and neighbouring States could monitor at least all major border crossings and airports in order to prevent illegal movement across the border. It is noted, however, that it may be extremely difficult to monitor effectively the land borders of Angola, given their length, the difficult terrain and the lack of the necessary infrastructure. In addition, the Government of Angola and the States of the region could consider additional steps to monitor the ports and airstrips in their territories in order to prevent ships and aircraft engaged in violations of the measures from using them;

(e) In cases where public announcements are made that confirm material support for UNITA, the Committee could authorize its Chairman to address letters to the Member States concerned. Similarly, in the event of confirmed violations of the travel ban, the Member States involved could be reminded of their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions;

(f) The Security Council could authorize the Secretariat to commission an expert study focusing on possible ways of tracing violations of the measures regarding arms trafficking, oil supply and the diamond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds.

15. On 12 January 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1221 (1999) concerning the issue of the possible suspension of telecommunications to UNITA, as mentioned in paragraph 8 of that resolution. I intend to report to the Council as soon as I receive the expert views that I have sought from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

## V. MILITARY ASPECTS

16. The military situation in Angola has deteriorated since early December 1998, with the commencement of a large-scale military operation in the central highlands. The situation remains volatile and very fluid, while information on the fighting is sketchy. The operations commenced on 2 or 3 December with air raids against areas around Bailundo and Mungo, followed by attacks on Andulo on 4 December. Subsequently, UNITA forces launched their own attacks and inflicted heavy casualties, including among the civilian population. In the Kuito sector, UNITA initially occupied several areas, forcing FAA to stop its operation against Andulo. The front apparently had stabilized by the last week of December, as FAA had regained some strategic ground around the town, using heavy artillery and aircraft. In the Huambo sector, UNITA attacks resulted in the withdrawal of FAA from Tchitumbo, Bela Vista and Vila Nova, as well as Alto Hama. The city of Huambo itself was shelled, and a very tense situation among the population was created. Large-scale government reinforcements arrived in the region throughout December, and intense fighting was reported in the vicinity of Huambo during the first week of January 1999. The government side has reportedly recaptured Vila Nova as well as areas in the central highlands, and has reopened the road between Huambo and Kuito.

17. The situation in other provinces remained extremely tense. Increased fighting was reported in the north, in the vicinity of M'Banza Congo and Soyo. Some government troops have redeployed from Uige, Malange, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito

Cuanavale and other areas to reinforce FAA in the central region. UNITA forces have continued to interdict the national highway linking Malange and the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sol provinces, and have launched raids on government positions around the diamond-producing areas of Luzamba. The city of Malange has sustained repeated shelling by UNITA, with numerous casualties among the civilian population. In Moxico province, the high level of insecurity on the roads almost isolated the town of Luena. In Huila province, UNITA reoccupied its old base in Chicuma in a bid to intensify military activities in Huila and Benguela provinces. In the meantime, the military situation became increasingly volatile in the southern region, especially in the northern part of Huila province.

## VI. POLICE ASPECTS

18. To the extent possible, civilian police observers attempted to monitor the activities of the Angolan National Police (ANP) to ensure their neutrality and respect for human rights. It should be noted that the civilian police have not been able to report on the situation in the UNITA-controlled areas. Also, on many occasions the escalation of fighting has prevented the observers from carrying out proper investigations and verification of reported incidents. This situation has been aggravated by the markedly non-cooperative attitude of the parties. Increasingly, the attitude of local officials and security agents has prevented civilian police observers and human rights monitors from carrying out patrols and visits to prisons or detention centres.

19. The widening hostilities have had a very negative impact on the general law and order situation in the country. In some areas, ANP has abandoned its traditional police role; its members have often been fighting side by side with FAA. There has been no progress in the efforts of MONUA to obtain cooperation in conducting a training programme for ANP on internationally accepted police procedures and standards. Similarly, no progress has been achieved towards the collection of weapons from the civilian population. Instead, reports indicate that civilians are being armed and organized in civil defence groups in Huambo, Huila, Bié and Benguela provinces, as well as in other areas of potential confrontation with UNITA forces. The role of these defence groups is not limited to the general protection of the population; they also fight alongside FAA after a brief training period.

20. In an effort to ensure the free movement of people and goods, civilian police observers conducted patrols and visited checkpoints manned by FAA/ANP and private companies in the locations not directly affected by the war. Although there has been no increase in the number of unauthorized checkpoints, there were reports of searches, harassment and extortion. Civilian police observers also continued to monitor security arrangements for UNITA leaders. In Luanda, ANP has continued to provide, albeit inconsistently, security protection to senior UNITA representatives. In that regard, it should be noted that five UNITA representatives have been arrested and accused of involvement in UNITA attacks on Kuito, Huambo and Malange.

## VII. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

21. MONUA continued to report grave human rights violations against the civilian population as a result of the escalation of hostilities, particularly in the provinces of Huambo and Bié. Indiscriminate shelling, reportedly by UNITA, killed at least 25 civilians and wounded approximately four times that number in a train station in Kunje, Bié province, on 16 December. According to unofficial sources, there were untold numbers of dead and wounded civilians in the town of Kuito, which humanitarian agencies had not been able to reach for weeks. Civilians have also suffered numerous casualties as a result of UNITA bombardment of the city of Malange. The plight of internally displaced civilians fleeing the fighting, who risk landmines, ambushes and abuses by combatants on both sides, is of grave concern. In addition, the fate of soldiers on both sides who are hors de combat remains uncertain, as humanitarian principles have rarely been respected in the conflict. There were reports of forced recruitment of young men, including minors, in Bié, Lunda Norte, Lunda Su and Moxico, among other provinces. Again, MONUA has been unable to report on human rights conditions in UNITA-held areas, which are presumed to be precarious.

22. Continuing human rights violations due to a malfunctioning judicial system and to misconduct by some elements of enforcement agencies have been reported from many parts of the country. Prison conditions remain below minimum standards. In order to help improve the situation, MONUA has recently completed a five-day training programme of 62 Angolan human rights counsellors who will staff human rights centres in the municipalities of Benguela. This project, which is supported by central and provincial Angolan government authorities, will permit citizens to make complaints about human rights abuses and seek legal remedies.

23. Promotion activities focused on the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its main theme of "Human Rights are Angolan Rights!". Activities at the national level included the broadcast on MONUA radio of a series of programmes with government officials and other experts discussing the Universal Declaration. At the provincial level, awareness campaigns on local radio stations and training workshops with community groups, as well as special activities, were organized with Angolan partners using the Universal Declaration as a central theme.

## VIII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

24. Since my previous report, the humanitarian situation in the country has drastically deteriorated. Following the loss of the two United Nations aircraft, all humanitarian air operations in Angola have been suspended, thereby ending the only possible means of delivering emergency relief supplies to many areas in the interior of the country. By some accounts, Angola is on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe. In several areas, the civilian population is trapped in the middle of the fighting, especially in the central highlands. The gradual worsening of security conditions in the country caused the number of new internally displaced persons to rise from 4,000 in April 1998 to 350,000 in November 1998. By the beginning of January 1999, the total number of new

internally displaced persons had reached 500,000, with reports of over 200,000 more. Numerous internally displaced persons previously sheltered in temporary settlements have had to flee for the second or third time in recent months. The hostilities have also led to the cessation of demining activities and the laying of new mines.

25. The immediate effects of the war have been increasing levels of malnutrition, especially among young children, and appalling sanitation and health conditions. As a result, the risk of epidemics has grown dramatically, especially in the war-affected areas, where the number of vulnerable persons is increasing rapidly, with little access to health care and medicine. Further deterioration of the situation may result in higher rates of mortality.

26. During the reporting period, the humanitarian community has concentrated on the provision of emergency assistance and has taken preventive measures to mitigate the effects of the current crisis. However, continued insecurity has forced humanitarian personnel to reduce the strength of field offices or to withdraw entirely. Vulnerable groups in the cities of Huambo, Kuito and Malange are being assisted with food and non-food items stockpiled during an earlier lull in the fighting. These stocks will most likely run out by mid-January 1999, if security conditions do not allow for relief supplies to be flown in soon. The above-mentioned three towns already accommodate almost 200,000 internally displaced persons, in addition to vulnerable host communities. Unless security can be provided for the transportation of humanitarian aid to the needy as well as for the personnel working in the field, it will be impossible to launch humanitarian operations in many affected areas. In the meantime, access to most of the interior of the country remains limited. It can therefore be assumed that the actual figures and needs of vulnerable groups could be even higher than currently estimated.

27. Should security conditions again allow a resumption of flights, the financial requirements of an intensive and sustained air operation will be well beyond currently available resources. The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, which was launched in December 1998, was developed under the assumption that emergency operations would focus on small pockets of vulnerable groups. However, recent events have altered that assumption, forcing humanitarian organizations to implement contingency plans and review their programme strategies. While the emergency needs outlined in the appeal remain valid, the added caseload will require a substantial increase in the emergency requirements to ensure an adequate response. It will also be important for the Government of Angola to increase its contribution to humanitarian programmes.

28. The ability of the humanitarian community to operate in Angola has also been very seriously affected by the constraints on access, including to UNITA-controlled areas, and the relocation of MONUA in Luanda with the resulting loss of United Nations military escorts for humanitarian convoys. It would be essential, in the present circumstances, for the United Nations to keep in mind the many lessons learned in similar recent humanitarian operations conducted amid open warfare. The future effectiveness of such operations in Angola will require a clear commitment by all concerned to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law, to allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations, to

establish modalities for relief assessments and deliveries country-wide and to fully guarantee the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. In addition, humanitarian organizations will have to strengthen their human resources in Angola and put in place enhanced communication networks and security measures.

29. The present hostilities have also severely affected mine-clearing activities in Angola. All relevant operations have been interrupted, and international staff have been withdrawn to Luanda. It is feared that the equipment of demining teams currently stored at provincial centres could be lost as a result of the conflict and that local deminers will be recruited to serve with either FAA or UNITA. In the circumstances, it would be important to maintain, in Luanda, a basic programme that would cover the most pressing demining needs. The components of such a programme should include the maintenance of a database, the continuation of the mine-awareness campaign and mine victims assistance, as well as the retention of an emergency demining cell and a basic training capacity. This basic programme would enable the United Nations to retain the necessary surge capacity during the hostilities and to rebuild the mine programme once the fighting has subsided.

## IX. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

30. The economic situation in Angola remains extremely precarious. The main factors indicated in my previous reports to the Council continue to have a significant impact on the economy. The implementation of policies and measures contained in the medium-term economic programme continues to suffer serious delays. The successive decline in the world prices of oil has gravely affected the financial situation of the Government. The 1998 budget was based on an expected price for Angolan oil of US$ 18 per barrel, whereas the present market price is closer to US$ 10. Thus, for every one dollar drop in prices, the Government loses nearly US$ 100 million per year. Not only do oil and petroleum products account for 50 per cent of gross domestic product, but over 80 per cent of government revenue is derived from the sale of those products.

31. It is obvious that Angola is confronted with a serious economic crisis. The annual rate of inflation is currently estimated at 100 per cent. The unpredictable fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, which have a direct bearing on prices, further exacerbate this situation. The Government has suspended its weekly devaluation of the national currency because, as a single policy measure, it has proved inadequate to address the deficiencies in the economy. It is estimated that government revenue has dropped by 30 per cent and, faced with a scheduled $1.2 billion loan payment for which oil was used as a guarantee, the Government may have to revert to further borrowing. The health, education, water and sanitation sectors bore the brunt of the cuts in expenditure brought about by the decline in oil prices.

32. In November, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission visited the country and reached a preliminary agreement with the Government on the need for a structural adjustment programme. This agreement was partly the result of an earlier visit to IMF by a government delegation to discuss IMF assistance programmes. The new agreement still awaits the official endorsement of the Angolan authorities.

## X. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. The General Assembly, by its resolutions 52/8 C of 26 June 1998 and 53/211 of 18 December 1998, appropriated a total amount of $130.8 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $10.9 million gross, for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999.

34. I anticipate that the resources provided by the General Assembly would be sufficient to meet the Mission's requirements, including basic contingencies in connection with a decision by the Security Council regarding the future of the Mission. In the event that the authorized resources should prove insufficient, additional resources will be sought from the Assembly.

35. As at 31 December 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)/MONUA special account amounted to $101.2 million. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,593.9 million.

## XI. OBSERVATIONS

36. The events of the last few months have clearly demonstrated that, for all intents and purposes, the Angolan peace process has collapsed and the country is now in a state of war. Heavy fighting is taking place in several regions of the country, with dire consequences for the civilian population.

37. The dialogue between the Government and Mr. Savimbi and his movement, which was de facto interrupted in June 1998 after UNITA refused the extension of Sate administration in their strongholds, is now non-existent. The joint negotiation mechanisms remained idle for months and MONUA was prevented from discharging its mediation tasks. The parties have publicly committed themselves either to "neutralize" their opponent politically or to escalate the military confrontation. Numerous resolutions of the Security Council, urging the Government and UNITA to stop the fighting and return to the peace process, have not been heeded. Regional efforts and bilateral demarches are often ignored or simply not acknowledged.

38. The root causes of this deeply regrettable state of affairs are well known. They lie in UNITA's refusal to comply with basic provisions of the Lusaka Protocol which demanded that it demilitarize its forces and allow State administration to be extended throughout the national territory. This situation has been compounded by a lack of political tolerance and by an unwillingness to engage in mutual accommodation; nor has there been any evidence of a genuine effort to build political support by improving the basic living conditions of the population.

39. In light of the expressed determination of the parties to test their fortunes on the battlefield, the steadily worsening security situation, and the inability of MONUA to carry out its mandate, it has become increasingly clear that, for the time being, the conditions for a meaningful United Nations peacekeeping role in Angola have ceased to exist. In addition, the Government of Angola has informed the United Nations that it did not intend to support the

extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate. President dos Santos reiterated this position to Under-Secretary-General Sevan at their meeting of 6 January in Luanda. The Government's position was subsequently announced in the media. Furthermore, as a result of what appeared to be a coordinated media campaign against the United Nations and MONUA, a negative public atmosphere has emerged, including cases of harassment of United Nations personnel and the refusal of some local officials to cooperate with MONUA. The recent promises to moderate public statements by officials about the United Nations and to assist MONUA in the safe relocation of its team sites to Luanda are therefore welcome.

40. With regard to UNITA, it has so far not taken any serious initiative to restore meaningful contacts with the United Nations or to resume the implementation of key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA has issued statements in favour of a continued United Nations presence. However, the attitude of some of its leaders towards the United Nations revealed itself when, in defiance of the universally recognized practice governing peacekeeping operations, 14 MONUA military and police personnel stationed in Andulo and Bailundo were prevented for several weeks from being redeployed to safer areas.

41. The presumed shooting down of two United Nations aircraft was a particularly outrageous crime apparently intended to intimidate the United Nations and force it to curtail its operations. I pay tribute to the ultimate sacrifice made by the passengers and the crews of these planes who, like the late Alioune Blondin Beye and his colleagues, dedicated their lives to the restoration of peace in Angola. I condemn these crimes in the strongest terms and am appalled by the parties' insensitivity and their lack of cooperation with the United Nations in the immediate aftermath of the crashes. It is imperative that a full-fledged investigation be conducted into the two incidents and that the perpetrators be identified. It is the least that can be done for the families of those reported missing while on a mission of peace. I urge, therefore, all concerned in Angola and beyond to assist in this endeavour.

42. Obviously, the Organization cannot impose its presence on the Angolan parties, nor can it play an effective role without their cooperation. The United Nations came to Angola at their explicit request and can be proud of what it accomplished. It has brought four years of relative peace, the longest such period Angola has ever enjoyed since its independence. However precarious and imperfect that peace may have been, UNAVEM III and MONUA provided to the Angolan parties ample political space in which to reach a peaceful solution and achieve national reconciliation. It is estimated that the United Nations and its programmes and agencies have also contributed up to US$ 1.5 billion in support of the peace process. History will, of course, pass judgement on the reasons for which this unique opportunity was missed. In the meantime, however, the parties and their leaders must assume full and direct responsibility for the suffering of their people.

43. In the circumstances, I believe that MONUA has no other option but to continue to reduce its presence within Angola, and proceed with the orderly repatriation of United Nations personnel and property as requested by the Angolan Government. If the present pace of redeployment is maintained, all MONUA team sites and regional headquarters will have been withdrawn to Luanda by

mid-February. Upon the expiration of MONUA's mandate on 26 February 1999, the United Nations would then proceed with its technical liquidation.

44. At present, I envisage that most of the military, police and civilian personnel of the Mission will have been repatriated by 20 March 1999. However, to conduct an effective liquidation, adequate human and material resources would have to be maintained in Angola. Given the scale and duration of the operations of UNAVEM and MONUA, it is estimated that four to six months would be required to complete this exercise on the ground. During the first few months of this period, the presence of a strong security detachment - an infantry company of up to 200 personnel - would be needed to protect United Nations property. It would also be necessary to retain an adequate air capacity, as well as other support services and administrative personnel. The presence of the infantry detachment would require the concurrence of the Security Council. I expect the Government and UNITA to extend their full cooperation to MONUA for its relocation to Luanda and for the repatriation of its personnel and equipment.

45. While MONUA can no longer play a useful role in the present circumstances, the United Nations and the international community should not and must not turn its back on Angola and the Angolan people. Undoubtedly, the resumption of the war will bring increased suffering for the civilian population and will have serious consequences for peace and security beyond Angola's borders. The United Nations must therefore remain actively involved and persist in its efforts to assist the Angolans to find the earliest possible resolution of this fratricidal conflict which has lasted longer than any other in Africa. I remain convinced that the long-term interests of the Angolan people and the principle of national reconciliation cannot be served by attempts to marginalize one's opponent or through a military solution. The United Nations, which has invested so much effort and resources in Angola, stands ready to play a political role, if requested, in order to assist all concerned in Angola in reaching a peaceful solution. Consequently, it is my intention to designate a senior official to serve as my Special Envoy for Angola. The Special Envoy would be based in New York, together with requisite support staff, and would cooperate and liaise with the members of the Security Council, with other interested Member States, and, to the extent possible, with the parties to the Angolan conflict, in efforts to bring peace to Angola. In case the political and military situation improves and the necessary conditions are in place, my Special Envoy, together with the support staff, could be rapidly relocated to Angola. Chief among the conditions for such a relocation would be unambiguous undertakings by the parties concerned to extend full cooperation to my Special Envoy for all purposes of the mission.

46. The work of the United Nations human rights presence in Angola has received well-deserved praise for its efforts to strengthen national institutions, promote human rights, and prevent their abuse. It should, subject to the concurrence of the Angolan parties and satisfactory security guarantees, continue its activities. Its activities would be aimed at strengthening systems for the administration of justice, developing the capacity of national institutions and non-governmental institutions in the field of human rights, gathering information about the human rights situation, disseminating information about and promoting understanding of human rights, and encouraging the growth of civil society as a partner in building peace and development for human rights, as well as providing technical assistance in relevant areas.

47. The humanitarian situation in Angola, already critical, has the potential to develop into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe. Humanitarian agencies and organizations are confronted with increasing numbers of affected persons, while access to them is hampered, if not prevented, by hostilities, landmines and restrictions with regard to UNITA-held areas. The United Nations is ready and willing to continue and intensify its humanitarian assistance to the Angolan people, but it cannot do so without guarantees of access and assurances for the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and operations. I urge the Government of Angola and the leaders of UNITA to provide such guarantees and assurances and extend their full cooperation to humanitarian agencies and organizations working in Angola.

48. I have instructed my Special Representative to consult urgently with the Government of Angola and all others concerned on the strategy and modalities outlined in paragraphs 45-47 above, including limited United Nations presence in Angola. I shall inform the Security Council of the outcome of these consultations as soon as possible.

49. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander and to all military, police and civilian personnel of MONUA, as well as to humanitarian workers and representatives of non-governmental organizations, for the courageous and dedicated way in which they have been carrying out their duties in the dangerous situation prevailing in Angola.

## Annex

### United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 18 January 1999

| | Military observers | Civilian police observers | Staff officers[a] | Troops | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | - | 15 | - | 15 | |
| Bangladesh | 3 | 20 | 1 | - | 24 |
| Brazil | 4 | 9 | 2 | - | 15 |
| Bulgaria | 3 | 13 | - | - | 16 |
| Congo | 2 | - | - | - | 2 |
| Egypt | 3 | 15 | - | - | 18 |
| France | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Gambia | - | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| Ghana | 3 | 6 | - | - | 9 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2 | 4 | - | - | 6 |
| Hungary | 3 | 8 | - | - | 11 |
| India | 5 | 11 | 8 | 138 | 162 |
| Jordan | 3 | 19 | - | - | 22 |
| Kenya | 3 | 6 | - | - | 9 |
| Malaysia | 4 | 16 | - | - | 20 |
| Mali | 3 | 12 | - | - | 15 |
| Namibia | - | - | 2 | 134 | 136 |
| New Zealand | 1 | - | - | - | 1 |
| Nigeria | 4 | 15 | - | - | 19 |
| Norway | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Pakistan | 3 | - | 1[b] | - | 4 |
| Poland | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |
| Portugal | 2 | 38 | 4 | 40 | 84 |
| Romania | - | - | 4 | 138 | 142 |
| Russian Federation | 3 | - | 3 | 100 | 106 |
| Senegal | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |
| Slovakia | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |

| | Military observers | Civilian police observers | Staff officers[a] | Troops | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | - | 14 | - | - | 14 |
| Sweden | 3 | 10 | - | - | 13 |
| Ukraine | 3 | - | 1 | - | 4 |
| United Republic of Tanzania | - | 3 | - | - | 3 |
| Uruguay | 3 | 27 | 2 | - | 32 |
| Zambia | 3 | 22 | 7 | - | 32 |
| Zimbabwe | 3 | 22 | 4 | - | 29 |
| Total | 86 | 309 | 39 | 550 | 984 |

Note: One United Nations military observer (Russian Federation), one United Nations police observer (Egypt), one United Nations police observer (Zambia), and one peacekeeper each from the Namibian Military Task Force (NAMMTF) and the Ration Support Unit (RASU) have been missing since 26 December 1998 owing to an aircraft accident; and one peacekeeper from NAMMTF has been missing since 2 January 1999 owing to an aircraft accident.

[a] Including military police.

[b] A military specialist in the demining school.




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